Macron's Gambit Accepted

An inspired move or an amateur's blunder?

Vladimir Putin says he's ready to talk to French President Emmanuel Macron about the war in Ukraine. The Russian declaration came in response to Macron's statement following the European summit that it would “again be useful” for “Europe” to speak to Russia rather than leave the United States to maneuver alone, as bilateral talks between Ukraine and the United States continue in Florida.

It hardly needs pointing out, however, that Putin agreed not to speak to “Europe” but rather to Macron, and he did so after the European summit put paid to Friedrich Merz's attempt to unite his EU partners around a stronger stance vis-à-vis Moscow.

Merz wanted to use Russian funds frozen in European banks to finance Ukraine's war effort. The ECB counseled against this move, which could have left member state governments on the hook for hundreds of billions of euros if the war were to be ended behind their backs by a treaty imposed on Ukraine by the US and Russia.

Belgium strongly supported the ECB view and was eagerly backed by Italy's Giorgia Meloni, who has emerged as a key figure in this context. But what finally did in Merz's effort was the quiet and under-reported reluctance of the French government to take the risk.

Macron came into office as a vocal supporter of a strong European Union and an independent European foreign policy. At the height of his glory, when he could still compare himself to Jupiter and stage a TV appearance in which a copy of Charles de Gaulle's Memoirs was carefully displayed on his desk, he portrayed himself as Europe's young and dynamic leader, held back by the cautious and stodgy Angela Merkel. Since then, however, his power at home has dwindled, France's finances have fallen into a shambles, and domestic support for any strong stance against Russia is in serious doubt. When France's new top general warned that the nation had to be ready to “sacrifice its children” if need be to counter the growing Russian menace, the backlash was strong and quick.

Macron evidently received the message loud and clear. While Merz, the leader of a party that was once perhaps the strongest European advocate of US foreign policy, was quick to see the new US National Security Strategy as leaving Europe suddenly on its own in facing the challenges of both Russia and China, the only powers that the US henceforth regards as peers, Macron prefers to pretend that the independent Europe he conjured up in his dreams actually exists and that he can represent its interests in a bilateral discussion with Russia.

Now, it is true that Macron has cultivated a close personal relationship with Zelensky, and it is also true that Macron has promised that his discussions with Russia will be “fully transparent” to the Ukrainian side. And no doubt he means it, and means to do well by his friend. He has his own grievances to discuss with Putin as well, including apparent Russian cyberattacks on French government ministries and infrastructure. Perhaps some good will come of this gambit. But when it comes to chess, the Russians are the masters, and I fear that Macron is overestimating both his skills and his board position. Not to mention the fact that either Putin or Trump could simply decide to overturn the board at any point.

Meanwhile, Merz will have to reassess his position in a political landscape that looks unpromising both domestically and internationally. Germany's economy is rapidly deteriorating; its infrastructural problems remain largely untouched; its exports, especially to China, which once made it the envy of Europe, are dwindling; and the governing coalition's political fortunes are dissipating as the far-right AfD continues to gather strength. Merz has correctly, in my estimation, interpreted the extent of policy changes required to meet the challenge of Trump's contemptuous withdrawal of all support, sympathy, and consideration for America's former allies; he promptly released the debt brake and took initial steps to rebuild Germany's military; but there is now reason to doubt that the coalition that underlies his government will remain in power long enough to see that project through to anything close to completion. Nor is it clear that the German public is any more enthusiastic about “sacrificing its children” than the French public: generals really should not be allowed to make such public pronouncements, even if they genuinely believe the conflict is already under way, as apparently many military and diplomatic observers already do, not only in Europe but also in the US.

Yet even if many in the US military believe that Russia is already engaged in aggressive cyberwarfare and political subversion, the US civilian leadership prefers to divert attention to Venezuela and other sideshows (e.g., Israel's consultations with Trump about renewing the attack on Iran's alleged nuclear sites). Donald Trump demands back “the oil and land” that Venezuela has allegedly stolen, wittingly or unwittingly legitimizing Putin's land grab in Ukraine, similarly based on unilateral historical revisionism. The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must.

I wish Macron the best of luck with his gambit, but I don't think the other players are limiting themselves to the usual rules of chess. Today's game, reflecting the tastes of the vulgarians now in power in Washington and Moscow, is closer to mixed martial arts than to the Game of Kings, despite the monarchical phantasmagorias of these elected authoritarians.